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NATIONAL SECURITY OFFENCES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN HONG KONG: A CRITIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
"CONSULTATION" ON ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW
On 24 September 2002 the Hong Kong Government published its Proposals
to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: Consultation Document.'In theory,
this commenced a three-month period of "public consultation" on a range of
criminal offences related to national security, namely, treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government and theft of
state secrets. However, what the Government has actually launched is a mas-
sive publicity campaign to persuade the public that its proposals are correct
and that opposing views on any major issues should be rejected, even before
the consultation period ends. Although many of the Government's proposals
are reasonable, others pose substantial threats to human rights. This com-
ment argues that the Government needs to slow down and pull back from its
current "hard sell" approach to Article 23 legislation. The Government should
also agree to the widespread public request that it publish a white paper (a
draft of the proposed legislation) once it has considered the public submis-
sions and drafted the specific language of the new offences.
Why is it so important that public consultation on Article 23 be done
properly? There are two reasons, neither of which is discussed openly in the
Government's consultation document. First, Article 23 is fundamentally
threatening because "national security" offences are regularly used in main-
land China to suppress political dissent. Second, although Hong Kong
currently enjoys civil liberties and the rule of law, it does not have a demo-
cratically elected government and there is no firm promise that it will get one
in the future. Thus an important safeguard that helps to prevent abuse of
national security laws in many countries simply does not exist in Hong Kong.
It is therefore particularly important that we do not retain or enact laws which
are based upon archaic relics of the colonial past or which might open the
door to the application of mainland law. Any Hong Kong laws implementing
Article 23 must be drafted very precisely and must expressly comply with
modem standards of human rights. There is also no reason to enact laws that
go beyond what is strictly required by Article 23, as this would only invite
undue interference in the civil liberties of Hong Kong people.
I Security Bureau, Hong Kong Government, Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: Consul-
tation Document (Sept 2002) (hereinafter the consultation document).
We should start by recalling exactly what is required by Article 23. It
provides that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR):
"... shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government or theft of
state secrets, to prohibit foreign political bodies from conducting political
activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies
of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or
bodies."
Article 23 was the subject of much debate when the Basic Law was being
drafted and it has been widely reported that the Hong Kong representatives
on the Drafting Committee (who were outnumbered by the mainland
representatives) were not happy with the final language.2 It is unfortunate
that the Basic Law was still in draft form in the summer of 1989, because the
Chinese Government made Article 23 much stricter after June 4 by adding
the language on subversion and the control of political organisations. The
final version of Article 23 was a warning to Hong Kong, issued at a time when
the Central Government was openly angry with Hong Kong people for pro-
testing against the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square. Thus it is not surprising
that Hong Kong people would view any legislative proposals implementing
Article 23 with a certain degree of scepticism and fear. Perhaps the only posi-
tive thing that can be said about Article 23 is that it does provide that Hong
Kong should enact the implementing legislation "on its own". Thus the Cen-
tral Government should not seek to dictate the precise content of the
legislation. Moreover, the investigatory powers and judicial procedures through
which the legislation is enforced should be consistent with Hong Kong's com-
mitment to due process and the protection of civil liberties.
If the promise that Hong Kong can enact these highly controversial laws
"on its own" is to have any meaning, however, there must be a genuine and
unbiased consultation exercise on the way forward. It was suggested (soon
after 1997) that the issue be sent to Hong Kong's Law Reform Commission.
The Law Reform Commission probably would have approached Article 23 in
much the same way that it has approached other controversial legal issues. It
2 See H. L. Fu, Richard Cullen and Pinky Choi, "Curbing the Enemies of the State in Hong Kong -
What Does Article 23 Require?" (2001-2002) 5 Journal of Chinese and Comparative Law 45, 49-52.
See also Martin Lee, "A Tale of Two Articles", in Peter Wesley-Smith and Albert Chen (eds), The
Basic Law and Hong Kong's Future (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1988).
3 In the draft of the Basic Law that was published in Feb 1989, Art 23 was shorter and stated simply:
"The Hong Kong SAR shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition,
or theft of state secrets". See Ming K. Chan and David J. Clarke (eds), The Hong Kong Basic Law:
Blueprint for "Stability and Prosperity" under Chinese Sovereignty? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1991) (reproducing the Feb 1989 draft at pp 145-161; see especially p 149).
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would have established a sub-committee to conduct a comprehensive study
of other countries' legislation in the field and to issue a neutral consultation
paper that summarised the research and sought the views of the community.
The Law Reform Commission would have then issued a report on the results
of the consultation and recommended how Article 23 could be implemented
without offending the constitutional guarantees of civil liberties in Hong Kong.
Since the Law Reform Commission is an independent body (with representa-
tives from the legal profession as well as the Government and the broader
community) the consultation exercise would have had substantial credibility
with the Hong Kong people. The Government would not have been bound
by the Law Reform Commission's recommendations, but the Commission
would have given the Government a sound basis on which to draft its propos-
als for legislation.
The Government has approached Article 23 in a very different manner.
When the Basic Law came into force on 1 July 1997, the Government made
certain limited amendments (approved by the Provisional Legislative Council)
which were clearly designed to implement Article 23 through existing laws.'
Then, for the next five years, the Government quietly conducted research and
drafted its proposals out of the public's view. It has also been reported that the
Government discussed its proposals with the Central Government before it
released them publicly.' The result is that the paper published by the Govern-
ment in September 2002 does not read like a typical consultation document. It
does not present alternatives, but rather a fully formulated proposal. It also
avoids mentioning the many criticisms that have been made (eg by law reform
commissions in other common law jurisdictions) regarding legislation that is
similar to that proposed for Hong Kong. When criticised for this, the Secretary
for Security was reported to have responded: "Of course, it is free for us, as
authors of the document, to quote whatever we think is helpful to our argument."6
This is quite different from the approach that would have been taken by the
Law Reform Commission, which would not have had any vested interest in
persuading the public to adopt a particular argument and thus would have been
willing to discuss expert opinions on both sides of an issue. One cannot help
4 For example, the Societies Ordinance (Cap 151) was amended to give the Government the power to
prohibit the operation of a society on the ground that it has connections with a "foreign political
organization" or on the ground that the Secretary for Security reasonably believes that such an order
is necessary in the interests of national security.
5 Cliff Buddle and Mary Luk, "Justice Chief's promise on sedition law", South China Morning Post
(SCMP), 12 July 2002, p I.
6 Emphasis added. See Angela Li and Ng Kang-chung, "Article 23 paper uses quotes that fit, Regina Ip
admits", SCMP, 31 Oct 2002, p 1; and Mark Daily, "Let's not follow the example of Malaysia",
SCMP, 6 Nov 2002 (calling upon the Government to release "a supplementary consultation docu-
ment including the comparative aspects of [the Government's] research that were not only helpful to
their arguments but that would be helpful to [the public] in coming to a fully informed view").
but form the impression that the Government's three-month consultation ex-
ercise is designed not to consult, but rather to sell a carefully packaged proposal
to the community.
This impression has deepened during the overwhelming publicity cam-
paign that followed the release of the Government's proposals. Only one week
into the three-month consultation period, the Chief Executive, Tung Chee
Hwa, confidently announced that there was broad support for the proposals
in Hong Kong.' The Secretary for Security has repeated this claim, despite
the fact that opinion polls "have indicated a level of support falling well short
of a majority".' Senior officials from the Security Branch and the Justice De-
partment have been sent out to public meetings to staunchly defend the
proposals. They have also been assigned to write newspaper articles and let-
ters to the editor. The Security Bureau's website actually contains a page
entitled "Myths and Facts", which labels objections to its proposals as "myths"
and does not acknowledge even the possibility that the proposals could in-
hibit civil liberties.' Perhaps the lowest point in this process was when Qian
Qichen, the Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China, entered the
debate by claiming (one month into the three-month consultation period)
that the majority of Hong Kong people support the proposals and that people
who doubted the proposals must have some guilty secrets or "devils" in their
hearts. He was quoted as asking: "Do they have worries because they have
things to fear? Otherwise what is the problem?""o
Is the Government right? Are the concerns that are being raised about its
proposals simply misguided "myths", with no basis in reality? Consider just
one example, from Chapter 7 of the consultation document. The chapter is
entitled "Foreign Political Organisations" and addresses the second half of
Article 23, which requires Hong Kong "to prohibit foreign political bodies
from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign po-
litical organizations or bodies". As the consultation document acknowledges,
this is one area in which Hong Kong law already complies with Article 23.
The Provisional Legislative Council amended the Societies Ordinance in 1997,
giving the Government the power to prohibit a society if it is a political body
that has a connection with a foreign political organisation or a political
7 See Angela Li, Ng Kang-Chung and Ravina Shamdasani, "Tung praises 'support' for anti-subversion
law", SCMP, 2 Oct 2002, p 3 .
8 See Editorial, "Wishful thinking", SCMP, 30 Oct 2002, p 17. See also May Sin-mi Hon and Angela
Li, "Most back security law, says Regina Ip", SCMP, 29 Oct 2002, p 1.
9 See Hong Kong Government, "Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: Myths and Facts",
available on the Hong Kong Government's website at http://www.info.gov.hk/sb/eng/23/leaflet2.htm.
1o See Ambrose Leung and Angela Li, "Opponents of Article 23 are outnumbered, says Qian", SCMP,
26 Oct 2002, p 3.
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organisation of Taiwan." The Government also already has the power to
prohibit a local society if it reasonably believes that it is necessary in the
interests of national security, public safety, public order or the rights and free-
doms of others. Indeed, the Government itself appears to acknowledge that
existing law fulfils the requirements of Article 23, stating in the consultation
document that:
"We believe that the existing provisions of the Societies Ordinance, in par-
ticular those governing the definition of 'foreign political organizations' and
'connections' are sufficient for the purpose of prohibiting foreign political
organizations from taking part in the political process of the HKSAR."
If that is the case then Chapter 7 should conclude there. Yet the Govern-
ment then goes on to propose new powers that go beyond the title of the
chapter and beyond the strict requirements of Article 23. The existing Soci-
eties Ordinance defines "society" as "any club, company, partnership or
association of persons, whatever the nature of objects, to which the provi-
sions of this Ordinance apply". The Government now proposes to extend its
powers to an "organization", to be defined as "an organized effort by two or
more people to achieving [sic] a common objective, irrespective of whether there
is a formal organizational structure".12
This is an extremely broad definition and the Government has not of-
fered any specific justifications for adopting it. The second worrying aspect of
the proposal can be found in the circumstances under which the Secretary for
Security may exercise the power to proscribe a local organisation. Subpara-
graphs (a) and (b) provide that such power can be exercised if the organisation
has the objective of committing, has attempted to commit, or actually has
committed any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state
secrets. However, subparagraph (c) proposes that an organisation could also
be proscribed in Hong Kong if:
"[T]he organization is affiliated with a Mainland organization, which has
been proscribed in the Mainland by the Central Authorities, in accordance
with national law on the ground that it endangers national security.""
This proposal could open a "connecting door" between mainland and Hong
Kong concepts of national security that is potentially much wider than that
required by Article 23 (which only refers to ties between local and foreign
I Consultation document, para 7.3 and Societies Ordinance, s 8.
12 Consultation document, para 7.15. Emphasis added.
13 Ibid., para 7.16.
political organisations). The Hong Kong Government has tried to reassure
the public by insisting that the Secretary for Security would not only have to
be satisfied by the evidence of affiliation, but would also have to "reasonably
believe that it is necessary in the interests of national security or public safety
or public order to ban the affiliated organization, before the power of pro-
scription can be exercised".' However, this provides little comfort. The Hong
Kong Government has expressly stated that it will "defer" to the Central
Government authorities on the question of whether a mainland organisation
threatens national security and that "formal notification" by the Central
Government that a particular organisation has been prohibited in the Main-
land on the ground of national security shall be conclusive on that issue."
Although the Government has stressed that this would not automatically mean
that the Hong Kong affiliate would also be deemed a threat to national security,
it does seem likely that the Secretary for Security would at least take into
account the views of the Central Government when deciding whether she
has a "reasonable belief' that the affiliated local organisation threatens na-
tional security. In fact, once this legal door is opened, it is hard to imagine our
Secretary for Security defying the Central Government by taking the oppo-
site view regarding a Hong Kong affiliate of a mainland organisation that has
been banned on national security grounds.
The dangers of this proposal are heightened by the fact that the Govern-
ment has proposed a curious two-step procedure for any appeals from a decision
to proscribe an organisation: it is suggested that points of fact should be ap-
pealed to an "independent tribunal" and that only points of law may be
appealed to a court.'6 The consultation document gives no information about
how this division would work in practice (many issues on appeal would actu-
ally be mixed questions of law and fact) or about the nature of the proposed
tribunal. The legal community is concerned by the proposal in any event,
since administrative tribunals are frequently criticised for being unduly defer-
ential to government decisions." The Government has sought to reassure
lawyers by suggesting that any decision would be subject to judicial review.
However, it would be exceedingly difficult for a local organisation to establish,
in an action for judicial review, that the Secretary for Security's belief that it
is necessary to ban a Hong Kong organisation in the interests of national
security is "unreasonable" (particularly if the law provides that the Central
Government's notification that the affiliate organisation in mainland China
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., para 7.18.
17 See Cliff Buddle, "Lawyers attack security tribunal plan", SCMP, 27 Oct 2002, p 2.
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has been banned on national security grounds is conclusive on that issue).
There is also the danger that the Government would later take the position
that the matter was an "act of state" and not subject to judicial review. As
one constitutional expert has noted:
"If full judicial review is to prevail, the language of the statute must clearly
state that all facts respecting the reasonable belief in a threat to national
security must be presented on review and that it will be for the court alone
to judge whether such a threat objectively exists. It should be clear that if
the government fails to make its case on the facts, then the ban must be
overturned. There should be no presumption in favour of the determina-
tions of either the central government or the local Secretary for Security.
Even if the statutory language is cleaned up ... [c]urrent statements that
the government will not seek to bar judicial review as an act of state are
clearly not binding on a future government. In this regard, since this is a
constitutional requirement it is not even clear the above suggested statu-
tory language would secure power for the courts. It would still be open to a
future Secretary for Security to challenge such statutory language limiting
her power as violating the Basic Law.""8
One must also ask whether it is wise to enact a statutory scheme that
could put the Hong Kong courts in the position of having to quash a decision
of the Secretary for Security proscribing a local organisation that is affiliated
with an organisation banned in the Mainland. It is easy for the Hong Kong
Government to reassure people that the courts will strike down laws or ex-
ecutive acts that do not comply with the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.19 However, the Hong Kong Government did not hesi-
tate to go to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress when
it did not like the "final judgment" of the Court of Final Appeal in the right
of abode cases and the resulting "reinterpretation" issued by the Standing
Committee dealt a severe blow to the independence of our courts.
Of course, the proposed new ground for prohibiting a local organisation
would not be so worrying if China were a free and open society. The problem
is that the Central Government's concept of "threats to national security"
includes much of what we would consider to be legitimate exercises of our
18 See Michael Davis, "Who defines national security?", Submission to the Hong Kong Legislative
Council, LC Paper No CB(2)201/02-03(11), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/
panels/ajls/papers/aj Is zz.htm.
19 See, for example, the letter to the editor of Mr James O'Neil, Deputy Solicitor General, SCMP,
2 Nov 2002, p 15, stating that the Hong Kong courts have "demonstrated that they can and will,
strike down laws and decisions" which conflict with the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights.
freedom of expression, association and academic inquiry. National security
offences tend to be poorly defined in China and are used to prohibit what
were formally known as "counter-revolutionary" activities.20 Although the
names of the offences may have changed, the reality of the situation has not;
peaceful expressions of dissent and criticism of the one-party State are simply
not tolerated in China and are severely punished. Thus it is completely un-
derstandable that Hong Kong people would be alarmed to see a proposal that
allows the Central Government's views of what is a "threat to national secu-
rity" to play any role in the decision to proscribe a Hong Kong organisation.
Naturally, the first group that comes to mind is Falun Gong, since it is
prohibited in China but currently allowed to operate in Hong Kong.2' The
Hong Kong Secretary for Security has dismissed these concerns, accusing critics
of the proposals of being "obsessed with Falun Gong" and noting that it is not
prohibited in China on the ground of national security, but rather on the
ground that it is an "evil cult". However, that distinction is meaningless since
the Chinese Government could change the ground under which Falun Gong
is proscribed at any time. (There is no independent legislature or court in
China to question the Central Government if it decides to proscribe Falun
Gong in the Mainland on the ground of national security.) Will the Central
Government seek to have Falun Gong prohibited in Hong Kong? It probably
would not do so in the near future as it would not want to undermine, so
quickly, the assurances given by the Secretary for Security during the Article
23 consultation exercise. However, the sword will be hanging over the heads
of this and any other organisation that is affiliated with a "prohibited"
organisation in China. For example, a representative of the Catholic Church
in Hong Kong has expressed concern that it may be considered to have an
affiliation with the underground church in the Mainland.2 2 There is a real
danger that the fear of proscription could have a chilling effect on the rights
of these and other organisations, both formal and informal.
Given that Article 23 only refers to relationships with foreign political
organisations, one would expect the Government to have offered some spe-
cific justification for the proposals regarding the prohibition of local
20 See Fu Hua Ling, "Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong", in Steve Tang (ed),
Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
2001), pp 75-76.
21 It should be noted that while Falun Gong is not prohibited in Hong Kong, it is also not popular with
certain Hong Kong Government officials, who have taken several opportunities to make disparaging
remarks about it. While these remarks may have been made only to appease the national government
(which no doubt finds the open existence of Falun Gong in Hong Kong extremely irritating), they
have raised concerns about freedom of religion and association in Hong Kong. See, for example, Asia
Human Rights Commission, "Hong Kong: Threats against Falun Gong Threaten 'One Country, Two
Systems"', available at http://wwwahrchk.net/hrsolid/mainfile.php/2001voll lno3/44/.
22 See Ella Lee, "Article 23 frightening says bishop; Catholic Church head voices anti-subversion law
fears and hits back at Beijing's top SAR envoy", SCMP, 4 Oct 2002, p 2.
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organisations. However, the Government does not point to one instance in
which the existing laws have proven too weak. Rather, the Government in-
sists that it is not really expanding its powers, claiming (on its "Myths and
Facts" webpage) that "the proposed mechanism does not go beyond the scope
of the existing power under the Societies Ordinance".23 If that is really the
case then one must ask why the Government went to the trouble of drafting
this new language, which it must have known would give rise to enormous
controversy? Is it trying to send some political message to local organisations
that are affiliated with groups in the Mainland? If so, is that an appropriate
use of this legislation?
In any event, it is clear that many experts do not agree with the
Government's claim that the proposals would not expand its power to pro-
scribe local organisations. Professor Albert Chen, a member of the Committee
for the Basic Law which advises the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress when it interprets the Basic Law, has described the proposal
regarding proscription of organisations as an effort "to amplify the power" that
the Government has under the existing Societies Ordinance and as "one of
the most controversial and politically sensitive proposals in the Document".24
He has also noted that the document does not provide any definition of "af-
filiation" (a crucial concept in the Government's proposals) and that a
"proscribed organization" would attract more severe sanctions than unlawful
societies under the existing Societies Ordinance." After Professor Chen made
these points at a recent conference26 (in which the Acting Solicitor-General
also participated), I asked whether the Government would now consider
amending the "Myths and Facts" page of its website. However, at the time of
writing, the website of the Security Bureau continues to maintain that its
proposals do not go beyond the existing Societies Ordinance.
The new mechanism for prohibiting a local organisation is but one ex-
ample of many worrying issues in the consultation paper.2 7 For example,
Chapter 8 proposes to give the Government "extraordinary powers to search
premises and to obtain financial information without warrant or prior judi-
cial authorization"." At present, Hong Kong police can enter private premises
23 See Hong Kong Government, "Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: Myths and Facts",
available on the Hong Kong Government's website at http://www.info.gov.hk/sb/eng/23/leaflet2.htm
at p 6 of 7.
24 See Albert Chen, "Treason, Secession, Subversion and Proscribed Organizations: Comments on the
Consultation Document", paper presented at Preserving Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: the Potential
Impact of Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law (conference organised by the Centre
for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 23 Nov 2002), pp 7-8.
25 p 8.
26 For conference details see n 24 above.
27 See generally the article by my colleague, Benny Tai, which appears at pp 579-614 of this issue.
28 See Simon Young, "State Powers of Investigation and Article 23", abstract of paper presented at
Preserving Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: the Potential Impact of Proposals to Implement Article 23
of the Basic Law (n 24 above).
without a warrant in an emergency to stop a crime. However, the Govern-
ment considers that it is also necessary to give the police emergency entry,
search and seizure powers to simply investigate certain Article 23 offences.
Commentators have rightly questioned whether this can be justified, given
that Article 23 itself says nothing about special enforcement powers. Moreover,
the legislature has not granted such extraordinary search powers for investi-
gations under equally important laws, such as those aimed at organised crime,
money laundering and terrorist financing. 0 Given the sensitive nature of
these offences, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which police would not
anticipate the need to obtain a search warrant for an investigation. Indeed,
in this modern era (when even secondary school students carry mobile
telephones), magistrates and judges are never completely out of contact and
thus a warrant could be obtained on an emergency basis if required. At a
minimum, the police should be required to demonstrate a real need (based
upon actual cases) before the legislature departs from this important prin-
ciple of personal and family privacy.
Chapter 6 of the consultation document, on theft of state secrets, has also
generated substantial public concern. This is a sensitive topic in Hong Kong
because the mainland authorities interpret "state secrets" very broadly and
have already prosecuted some Hong Kong journalists and scholars for alleg-
edly violating national state secret laws while working in the Mainland." It
would be wise, therefore, to take a cautious approach and do the minimum
that is required under Article 23. Yet the Hong Kong Government appears
to want to legislate beyond the strict requirements of the Basic Law, main-
taining that "Article 23 should not be interpreted as implying that information
other than state secrets needs no protection".32 The Government proposes
to broaden the restrictions on "unauthorized and damaging disclosure" of
protected information." The existing Official Secrets Ordinance only pro-
hibits the disclosure of such information by people who have come across
the information in the course of their duties (eg public servants and govern-
ment contractors) or by those who have obtained the information from such
people. The Government claims that this is a major "loophole" in the law
because it does not sanction other subsequent disclosures of the information.
It thus seeks to prohibit the making of an unauthorised and damaging disclo-
sure of information that was obtained directly or indirectly by unauthorised
29 Consultation document, para 8.5.
30 Young (n 28 above).
31 See, for example, Gary Cheung, "Researchers fear study threatened by new law", SCMP, 14 Oct
2002, p 5 (interviewing Dr Li Shaomin, formerly an academic at City University of Hong Kong, who
was detained for five months in China).
32 Consultation document, para 6.14.
33 Ibid., para 6.22.
3 See Official Secrets Ordinance (Cap 521), ss 14-18 and the consultation document, paras 6.15-6.22.
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access to it. The Security Bureau appears to dismiss concerns about this
proposal, claiming (on its website) that it is a "myth" that it would widen
the scope of the offence of unlawful disclosure to cover people who are not
public servants. Of course, strictly speaking, the Government could pros-
ecute an ordinary citizen under the existing law, but it would be extremely
difficult to do so. The proposed new offence would, indeed, broaden the
potential criminal liability of people who do not work for the Government
and it poses a particular threat to news reporters." Indeed, Professor Chen
has argued that unless "unauthorized access is clearly defined to limit it to
computer hacking or other prescribed criminal behaviour the proposal ...
will be a very severe threat to press freedom and freedom of information in
Hong Kong". 6 Journalists and publishers have asked that the Government
abandon this proposed offence or, at a minimum, adopt public interest and
prior publication defences." Representatives of the business community are
also concerned by this proposal as they recognise that it could seriously un-
dermine access to information, which is crucial to a healthy business
environment." The potential impact of the new offence would be height-
ened by the fact that the Government also proposes to include, as a class of
protected information, "information relating to relations between the Cen-
tral Authorities of the PRC and the HKSAR"." This category is extremely
vague and broad and is particularly threatening to journalists, because sto-
ries on the relations between the two governments are regularly reported in
Hong Kong newspapers. 40 The proposals regarding sedition have also caused
great concern among journalists," publishers,42 academics, lawyers and even
3 For examples of journalists' concerns, see, for example, the written submission by the Foreign Cor-
respondents Club of Hong Kong, dated 18 Nov 2002, available at htpp://www.fcchk.org/medial
b123-1.htm.
36 See Professor Albert Chen, "Will Our Civil Liberties Survive the Implementation of Article 23?",
Hong Kong Lawyer, Nov 2002, pp 80-88, at p 87.
37 See, for example, letter from Cyril Pereia, Chairman of the Society of Publishers in Asia (SOPA), to
the Legislative Council Panel on Security, 29 Oct 2002; and Hong Kong Journalists Association,
Submission to the Legco on the Government's Consultation Paper on Basic Law Article 23 Offences.
38 See, for example, British Chamber of Commerce, Response to the Hong Kong SAR Government Consulta-
tion of Article 23 of the Basic Law, 19 Nov 2002. See also Ravina Shamdasani, Ernest Kong and Cheung
Chi -fai, "Foreign banks voice concerns over Article 23", SCMP, 3 Dec 2002, p 1; and Mark L. Clifford
and Pete Engardio, "Is the Sun Setting on Hong Kong's Freedom?", Business Week, 18 Nov 2002.
3 Consultation document, para 6.19. See also Professor Johannes Chan, "Theft of State Secrets and the
Proposed New Offence of Unauthorized and Damaging Disclosure of Protected Information", paper
presented at Preserving Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: the Potential Impact of Proposals to Imple-
ment Article 23 of the Basic Law (n 24 above); and Ronny Tong, "Article 12 Legislation: State
Secrets - What You Must Know", pamphlet published by the Article 23 Concern Group, Nov 2002.
40 See, for example, Hong Kong Journalists Association, "Enactment of Article 23: HKJA fears SAR's
media centre status, freedoms, could be at risk", available at http://www.freeway.org.hk/hkja/
press free.statement/article 23-ENG.htm.
41 Ibid.
42 See Pereia (n 37 above).
43 See Dr Fu Hau Ling, "Past and Future Offences of Sedition in Hong Kong", paper presented at Pre-
serving Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: the Potential Impact of Proposals to Implement Article 23 of
the Basic Law (n 24 above).
librarians.44 As one commentator noted, the proposal to criminalise posses-
sion and "dealing" in seditious publications would require:
"everyone who comes into contact with a publication, or proposal to pre-
pare some publication, to ask whether the publication would be likely to
incite some unknown individual to commit treason, secession, or subversion.
If there is any reason to suspect it would, the person must refuse to have
anything to do with it. When one writes or edits an article, or files a report,
or copies some materials or even allows some material to come into or re-
main in one's possession, one must ask the same question." 
I would argue that this brief summary of concerns challenges the
Government's position that the proposals enjoy broad support in Hong Kong.
The fact is that a large number of well-informed people in the community,
from a range of professions and political viewpoints, regard the proposals as
threatening to civil liberties and the flow of information in Hong Kong. In-
ternational organisations, foreign governments and foreign professional bodies
are also taking an interest46 and a campaign to oppose the overly broad pro-
posals has been launched by journalists from around the world.47 The level of
international interest is not surprising because Hong Kong, while small, is a
very special place - it is the only territory in China that enjoys freedom of
expression and access to information. The international community and for-
eign investors are naturally concerned by laws that could allow the eventual
erosion of those freedoms.
The Security Bureau's tendency to label concerns about Article 23 as
"myths" will not be enough to quiet this debate. It does appear that the Gov-
ernment may be willing to compromise on certain discrete issues. However,
statements made by certain senior officials give the impression that the
Government's position on the big issues is pre-determined and simply not
negotiable. Indeed, the Secretary for Security has an unfortunate tendency to
reject criticisms very quickly, insisting that they are "unbalanced" and
"paranoid", based on "spurious grounds" and a "flawed understanding".4  What
4 See letter from Dr Anthony W. Ferguson, Librarian for the University of Hong Kong, to the Members
of the Security Panel of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, dated 17 Oct 2002 (seeking an exemp-
tion for libraries for any seditious offences), available at http://www.article23.org.hk.
45 See Margaret Ng (a barrister and the representative of the legal profession in Hong Kong's Legislative
Council), "Next will it be a crime to own books?", SCMP, 6 Nov 2002.
46 For example, the British House of Commons has debated the issue and it has been reported that the
British Bar Association also plans to study the proposals. See Jimmy Cheung, "Overseas investors'
fears ignored at our peril, Martin Lee warns: Bar Association in Britain will give its view of proposals",
SCMP, 25 Nov 2002, p 2.
47 See Jimmy Cheung, "Journalists in 155 countries form a united front against Article 23", SCMP, 25
Nov 2002, p 2.
48 See, for example, Regina Ip, "Hong Kong Needs National Security Laws", Wall Street Journal, 30 Sept
2002.
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is most disappointing is the fact that the Government has so far refused to
promise to issue a white paper after the conclusion of the initial public con-
sultation exercise. Rather, the Government has suggested that it will start
drafting the formal "blue bill" as soon as the initial three-month consultation
is concluded, with the aim of introducing it promptly into the legislature.
Indeed, some people believe that the drafting of the bill actually began long
before the end of the consultation period and that the Government will seek
to have the bill enacted by the summer of 2003, a mere nine months after the
start of the process of public consultation.
There has been widespread opposition to the hasty approach to such impor-
tant legislation taken by the Government. Academics, students, lawyers,
legislators, journalists, business groups and a wide range of community and reli-
gious organisations have all implored the Government to slow down, to issue a
white paper in 2003 and to conduct a full round of consultation on it. Even
Anson Chan, the former Chief Secretary of Hong Kong (who has generally
refrained from making public comments on government policy since her
retirement) has urged the Government to publish a white paper. 49 A white
paper would give the public an opportunity to comment upon the specific lan-
guage of the proposed offences, which is missing from the consultation document.
Government officials have argued that this is not necessary because the public
can always comment on the formal blue bill when it is considered by the
legislature. The problem with that approach is that most people feel that it is
more difficult to amend a legislative proposal once it is formally introduced as a
blue bill. The fear is that the Government will become hardened in its views
once it has introduced a formal bill. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult for the
legislature to amend a formal bill over the objections of the Government. This
is because an amendment proposed by a legislator will only pass if it receives a
majority of the votes from both groups of legislators - those elected by the
undemocratic "functional constituencies" and those elected by the geographic
constituencies and the election committee."o Suppose, for example, that 44 of
our 60 legislators voted for an amendment to the Government's bill; it could
still fail if a mere 16 functional constituency legislators voted against it. Thus,
by lobbying a small number of functional constituency representatives (who
are generally quite conservative) the Government could defeat an amendment
that is supported by the majority of legislators. This is why people would prefer
to see the specific language of the proposed new offences in the form of a white
paper - in the hope that the Government can be more easily persuaded to
amend the language at that informal stage.
49 See Cheung Chi-fai, "Come clean on Article 23, says Anson Chan", SCMP, Dec 2002, p 2.
50 See Basic Law, Annex II, Part II.
It was recently reported that the Security Bureau may consider publishing
a draft version of the legislation." However, at the time of writing no prom-
ises have been made and it is not at all clear that the Government will be
willing to adjust its legislative timetable to allow for a full round of public
consultation on a draft bill. If the Government is determined to pass the
legislation by the summer of 2003 then it will be almost impossible to first
conduct a meaningful consultation on a white paper. Indeed, in that short
period of time it would be difficult for the Legislative Council to conduct
comprehensive public hearings on the formal blue bill. The public's reaction
to the consultation document demonstrates that a large number of individu-
als and organisations will want to make written and oral submissions on the
actual bill - perhaps more submissions than for any other piece of legislation
enacted since the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR in 1997. The public's
interest in commenting on the legislation should not be viewed with hostility
and the legislative process should not be rushed. Rather, comments and sug-
gestions for change should be welcomed and should be considered with an
open mind. It is not too late for the Hong Kong Government to slow down its
timetable, soften its public stance and adopt a more flexible approach to Ar-
ticle 23.
Carole J. Petersen*
5 See Angela Li and Chris Yeung, "Article 23 draft law to be considered, says Security Bureau", SCMP,
9 Nov 2002, p 8.
* Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Hong Kong.
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